FORWARD ONCE MORE
The destruction of Fifth Company at the battle of Lundby 1864.
- By Benjamin T. Christensen

“Then the Germans fired their first volley and the result was horrifying. Almost all, both those who were hit and those who were not, threw them self flat on the ground, though it gave them little cover. Some, amongst those myself, continued to move forward; but as we were too few to do anything we had to lie down quite near to the enemy. I lay in a field and fired my rifle a few times, but when I saw the company retreat I got up to follow it, and now the bullets started whistling around me until one strafed my left thigh and went right through the right one. Shortly after I stood up and limped forward a bit. But my loss of blood was too big and exhausted I fell down.”

These are the words of private Holger Petersen describing his part in what was to become the last action during the Second Schleswig War (War of 1864), the battle of Lundby, between Denmark and her opponents Prussia and Austria-Hungary. As it may appear from Holger Petersen’s description the battle went awfully wrong for the Danish side. In the following we well take a look at how a combination of bad leadership and superior weapons technology caused one of the biggest massacres in the history of the Danish military.

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THE ROAD TO BATTLE
In the summer of 1864 the Second Schleswig War was nearing it’s end. Prussian and Austro-Hungarian forces had occupied almost all of the Jutland peninsula and was now preparing to throw out the last remaining Danish forces there. After it’s defeats at Dybbøl and Als the Danish army had given up the defense of Jutland leaving behind only a small force under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Charles Beck. His orders were to delay the Prussians’ advance on the northern part of Jutland while covering the retreat (by sea) of the main force. With his camp in Aalborg and Nørresundby Beck’s orders also allowed him to move further south should the opportunity arise without disproportionate risk.

When, on July 2nd, Beck got knowledge of three Prussian scouting commands each of company size marching towards Aalborg by different roads, he ordered his Fifth Company of app. 184 men under the command of Captain P.C.C. Hammerich to attack the western most command, preferably surprising them while camped for the night at the small village of Ellidshøj. Beck himself would assume command of the expedition.

Reaching Ellidshøj at 3 o’clock in the morning on July 3rd the Danish forces found that the Prussian command had retreated. But being assured by locals that there was a second Prussian command at the nearby village of Gunderup Beck ordered his force to move at full pace against it, only to reach Gunderup shortly after the Prussians had left.

Map of the area south of Aalbog with Danish picket lines (blue) and Prussian movements (red)

When interviewed in 1912, Peder Johannsen, a resident of Gunderup, remembers a conversation he had with Beck as he and his men entered Gunderup: “He came to me and asked me about the Prussians. I told him what I knew, how many they were, in what direction they had gone, and at what time they had left Gunderup.

“How far can they have gotten?” he asked me
“They can barely have reached Lundby yet,” I answered, and when he wanted to know where that village was, and how the terrain was there, I gave him the information, also about the long hill leading down to the village.
“But you can move past it by two roads,” I said, “and you can get right into the village without being noticed.”
To that he gave me a short and negative answer so I got all embarrassed.
“Yes, the Lieutenant-Colonel must excuse me” I said. “I’ve never been a soldier myself and do not understand such matters, but I give my advice with the intention to help. If the Prussians are in Lundby, it’s going to be ugly to walk down that hill!”
“Yes thanks! That’s enough!” said the Lieutenant-Colonel and then he and his men marched north right behind the Prussians.”

On their way to Lundby Beck and his force received several warnings from locals not to follow the main road leading from the south over the big hill known as Kongehøj (King’s Hill), and instead approach the Prussians from the east through a low valley or from the west where hedgerows would cover the advance. Either way letting the company get right into the village without the Prussians noticing anything until it would be too late. None of these warnings were listened to. When a peasant offered to lead the force through the valley Beck refused the offer, stating that his men “shall not be led by a simple peasant!” At 4 o’clock in the morning Fifth Company reached Kongehøj overlooking Lundby.

Map of the Lundby area. The Danish force arrived from the south refusing to use the valley east of Lundby to cover it’s advance.

Meanwhile in Lundby part of the Prussian commando was moving out, heading north where they would later engage Danish picket lines near the village of Sønder Tranders, leaving behind 124 men under command of Captain von Schlutterbach in Lundby. Von Schlutterbach’s force was busy requisitioning horses and wagons in Lundby when a bugle call from the trumpeter was suddenly heard.

THE BATTLE
The Prussians had noticed the Danish force at the top of the hill and suddenly found them self in a race against time. With their rifles placed in pyramids on a field just north of the village, the Prussians had to move fast in order to get to their guns before the enemy were upon them. From the top of the hill Beck had a good oversight of the battlefield in front of him. With his men slowly making their way up the hill behind him, he had time to survey the area. In front of him the road was leading down the long sloping hill making a bend about 200 meters before it reached the village. On both sides of the road were fields. At the southern edge of the village he could see an earth dike that would give the Prussians good protection. It was obvious that whoever reached that dike first would get the upper hand in the the battle that would soon start. Noticing this Beck ordered Captain P.C.C. Hammerich to form the men into half columns, a formation that was quick to form but against regulations as it was too vulnerable to fire. But time was of the essence. With a “hurrah” the 184 men of Fifth Company started moving down the sloping hill.

From the village Søren Uhrenholdt witnessed what then happened: “We saw the Prussians line up behind Niels Christensen’s farm, and from there they moved into Kristen Winther’s garden, where they took up position behind the earth dike with their rifles pointing towards the road. They had good cover all of them. Only a commander stood up, likely to have a good view of it all. [...]

[...] From Jens Kristian’s courtyard we could see the Danish column all the way, but from Kristen Winther’s dike they were hidden by a part of the hill, and it was afterwards told, that he who was in command [of the Prussians], had much trouble keeping the agitated soldiers from firing their guns.

Then the Danes came forward from behind the hill with a “Hurrah!” and at the same time the first volley was fired by the Prussians. It looked as if a long flame ran all along the dike. That salvo had an immense effect. To us it looked as though the whole Danish column fell, and there was a moment of silence, where it looked as if it was all over. But then the Danes advanced again. Some of those who had fallen to the ground jumped up and moved forward. But then they spread out, and started firing.

But their bullets went right above the heads of the Prussians and flew bewildered around in the village. Some hit the wall close to us, and we retreated to the farm to save ourself. From there we could see nothing, but it was all over soon anyway. Another volley was fired and then it was all silence.“

The battle only lasted a few minutes. With a use of 750 bullets the Prussians had killed, wounded or captured 98 Danes receiving only three wounded of their own. Such a display of superior firepower resulting in such a devastating defeat had never been witnessed before. The result was quickly tributed to the Prussians’ use of breech loading rifles, which allowed them to fire much faster, with greater accuracy and lying down in cover. Whereas the Danes with their muzzle loaders had a lower rate of fire, and had to stand up in order to load, which of course offered a bigger target for their opponents to hit. But could that be the only explanation?

REASONS
As has been mentioned earlier Beck chose not to lead his men around the flanks of the Prussians through the valley or behind the hedgerows. Had this been done, he would most likely have taken the Prussian force by surprise. Later an anonymous Prussian who took part in the battle stated, that at first the Prussians thought them self surrounded and only put up a fight as to stand better in case they would have to defend their actions against accusation of cowardice later.

So why didn’t Beck lead his men through the valley. To answer this question we must look upon the history of the 1st regiment to which Fifth Company belongs. Beck came to the regiment in the winter of 1863 as his first field command. Until then he had only had staff duty as an officer, and spent most of his time on his political career. He soon wrote the high command in order to get transferred stating that he had no experience with field command, and that he did not fit in well with the men.

When the war broke out he lead 1st Regiment into battle. At Sankelmark the regiment became famous when they stopped the pursuing Austro-Hungarian forces, for which Beck received much praise and glory. The truth is though, that Beck left his regiment at an early stage of the battle to escort a wounded colleague to an aid station leaving the regiment without a commander. Only good leadership skills from the regiments former commander (now leading the whole brigade) Colonel Max Müller saved the day. For leaving his men in the heat of battle Beck could very well have faced trial, but instead he became a hero. The reason for this being that he was responsible for putting together the official report of the battle that was sent to the high command. Thus giving him a chance to give himself far more credit than was deserved. One can imagine how it must have been for him, working among colleagues who knew the truth, and it is reasonable to assume that his actions at Lundby were his try to live up to the fame he had falsely gained. He was not even supposed to be their. He should have been in Nørresundby/Aalborg with the regimental staff not on an expedition with a single company.

At the time his actions at Lundby were not judged as harsh as we do today. In fact he got promoted. He had let his men in a heroic attack upon the enemy, a bayonet charge that however outdated by weapons technology it might have been, at that time still was the favored style of attack. When describing the training of 1st regiments a few years earlier a fellow officer wrote: “We attack them head on with the bayonets fixed, all their bullets fly right over our heads.” And a few weeks after the battle of Lundby the high command issued a statement to all troops on the island of Fyn (Fuen) urging them to fix bayonets and push any enemy invaders back into the ocean. So while we may judge Beck’s actions as outdated and irresponsible from a modern perspective, we must also acknowledge that he was just a man of his time.